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Germany like many other European countries subsidize commuting by granting the right to deduct commuting expenses 
from the income tax base. This regulation has often been changed and has regularly been under debate during the last 
decades. The pros (e.g. causing efficiency gains with respect to the spatial allocation of labor) and cons (e.g. causing 
urban sprawl) are well documented. Nonetheless, there is need for further research. For reasons of tractability the few 
models applied in the tax deduction related literature are based on restrictive assumptions particularly concerning the 
design of the income taxation scheme and the structure of households (neglecting household heterogeneity) and, most 
importantly, they do not integrate labor supply and location decision problems simultaneously. Here, for the first time, 
those and more features are taken into account in a full spatial general equilibrium simulation approach calibrated to an 
average German city. This model is applied to calculate the impacts of tax deductions on an urban economy thereby 
considering different funding schemes. Our results suggest that the tax deduction level currently chosen is below the 
optimal level in the case of income tax funding. If a change in the tax base occurs, e.g. toward consumption tax or 
energy tax funding, the optimal size of the subsidy should be even higher. Furthermore, the different policy packages 
cause a very differentiated pattern regarding welfare distribution, environmental (CO₂ emissions) and congestion effects. 
We  also  find  surprisingly  small  effects  on  urban  sprawl  characterized  by  suburbanization  of  residences  and  jobs, 
increasing commuting distances and spatial city growth. 
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Commuting expenses reduce the income tax liability in many European countries, in par-
ticular in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,1 Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway and Switzerland (see Potter et al., 2006). In Germany this regulation has often
been changed and has been under debate for decades.
Advocates of income tax deductions2 emphasize that they reduce distortions concerning
individual labor supply (Wrede, 2000; Wrede, 2001; Sinn, 2003), eliminate spatial misallo-
cations in particular concerning working location decisions (Gasche, 2006; Wrede, 2009),
or improve aggregate productivity if it is spatially di⁄erentiated (Wrede, 2009, Borck and
Wrede, 2009). In contrast, objections against tax deductions arise (i) since commuting
subsidies might induce negative externalities and, thus, constitute a ￿ bad￿(Richter, 2006),
(ii) for reasons of equity because high-income households bene￿t the most (e.g.Kloas and
Kuhfeld, 2003), (iii) because it discriminates in favor of commuters who can avoid high
rents in central cities but at the same time bene￿t from subsidized living at low-rent sub-
urbs (Wrede, 2004; DIW, 2008), or (iv) since costs arising on account of privately caused
decisions concerning commuting should not be subsidized (Gasche, 2004; Wrede, 2004;
Richter, 2004; Richter, 2006).
Richter (2004) shows clearly that the issue whether commuting expenses should be tax
deductible depends on whether it is privately or occupationally caused. They should be
deductible only in the latter case because they are indispensable for earning income and,
thus, should be exempted from the income tax base. This so called net-principle is the
main reasoning in favor of tax deductions in Germany. The German Advisory Board
for Economic Development (SVR, 2003) suggests that about 50% of the tax deduction is
occupational caused. Wrede (2004) considers a deduction rate of slightly less than the
current rate of 0.30 e/km as optimal. Bach (2003), Bach et al.(2007), Donges et al.(2008),
Schulze (2009) argue in favor of a reduction of deductibility. In contrast, Richter (2004)
takes his presumption that employer do not pay higher wages for commuters as evidence
that commuting is almost entirely privately caused and, therefore, should not be tax
deductible at all.
1For example in Germany income tax deduction of commuting expenses caused total income tax savings
(or governmental income tax losses) of commuters of about 4 billion e in 2006 (Bach et al., 2007).
2In the following we only use the term ￿ tax deduction￿ .
1This short review shows that the pros and cons are well known. However, the ur-
ban/transport economics literature lacks in quantitative studies analyzing economic and
spatial e⁄ects regarding tax deductibility of commuting expenses. Even in technical pa-
pers employing modeling approaches (Wrede, 2001; Wrede, 2009) the optimal size of the
deductions is debatable because it depends on the speci￿c features (not) implemented in
the theoretical models. Therefore, optimal deduction rates are not yet fully derived since
the di⁄erent lines of reasoning are yet not integrated in one uni￿ed approach. For exam-
ple, the models used in the literature do not simultaneously implement spatial location
and labor supply decisions along with distortionary taxation because such an approach is
not analytically solvable. Moreover, the models rely on restrictive assumptions concerning
the design of the income taxation scheme and the structure of households living in the
urban area (they usually neglect household heterogeneity). Consequently, it is not at all
clear how e¢ ciency e⁄ects concerning residential and employment location distortions,
labor supply distortions, e⁄ects on externalities such as congestion, or e⁄ects on travel
mode choice and on welfare distribution behave if all those features are simultaneously
considered. This is a serious gap in the debate because the consequences of not integrating
these important features are not clear in advance.3 Would this either imply a lower or a
higher deduction rate than the current level? Is there a strong e⁄ect on urban sprawl and
the environment, e.g., characterized by changes in travel related CO2 emissions?
This is our point of departure. We ￿to the best of our knowledge for the ￿rst time ￿apply
a spatial general equilibrium model calibrated to an average German metropolitan area
to analyze the impacts of commuting subsidies characterized by tax deduction. Our focus
is on the optimal tax deduction rate and the impact of varying the deduction rate on the
urban economy. In addition, we go a step further in comparison to the literature where
it is usually assumed that subsidies are either ￿nanced by lump-sum or income taxes.
This might be useful from a systematic point of view. Nonetheless, if policymakers adjust
taxes it is more appropriate to consider taxes which are less distortionary than an income
tax. This is the reason why we implement revenue neutral tax reforms where we look at
3Of course, there is a large body of literature on transport subsidies in general (see e.g.De Borger
and Wuyts, 2009; Parry and Small, 2009; Borck and Wrede, 2009; Su and DeSalvo, 2008; Borck and
Wrede, 2008; Brueckner, 2005; Borck and Wrede, 2005; van Dender, 2003; Calthrop, 2001; Martin,
2001; Zenou, 2000) applying either non-spatial or spatial approaches. Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2011)
provide a review of the corresponding literature and summarize the main ￿ndings. Nonetheless, except
for Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2011), all these papers neglect the simultaneous consideration of these
features and there is no corresponding study focusing on income tax deduction of commuting expenses.
2di⁄erent taxes used to ￿nance tax deductions of commuting expenses. In particular, the
following funding schemes are considered: income tax, sales tax and energy tax4 funding.
This allows to consider a wide range of di⁄erentiated funding related e⁄ects. For example,
funding tax deduction by sales or energy taxes also implies an increase in shopping trip
costs, i.e.the costs of non productive time use while in particular energy tax funding may
also induce changes in travel mode choice.
The model we apply is a numerical spatial polycentric city model in the tradition of Anas
and Xu (1999), Anas and Rhee (2006; 2007) and had been extended by Tscharaktschiew
and Hirte (2010a, 2010b) in di⁄erent ways. In the model residential, employment and
shopping location decisions as well as labor supply decisions are endogenous. Moreover,
the approach takes household heterogeneity, progressive income taxation, travel mode
choice and endogenous automobile congestion, gasoline consumption and CO2 emissions
into account. These features have never been simultaneously treated in a spatial economic
model when studying tax deduction of commuting expenses.
Our results suggest that the current level of the tax deduction rate is about one third
of the optimal level if it is ￿nanced by income taxes. Then, the optimal deduction rate
were, on the one hand, about the same size as monetary round-trip commuting cost but,
on the other hand, still considerably smaller than full economic (incl.time cost) round-
trip commuting cost. If, however, a change in the tax base occurs the subsidy should be
considerably higher. With respect to urban welfare and environmental e⁄ects the combi-
nation of an increase in tax deductibility with energy tax funding turns out to be the best
policy. In this case there is a signi￿cant decline in the congestion externality and in travel
related CO2 emissions. Furthermore, the di⁄erent funding scheme cause heterogeneous
redistribution e⁄ects. Surprisingly, the analyses also suggest quite small impacts on urban
sprawl. According to these ￿ndings, tax deduction of commuting expenses contributes
only to a minor extent to suburbanization.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides a short theoretical discussion of
the e¢ ciency aspect of tax deductions under di⁄erent funding schemes. In Section 3 we
describe the simulation model. In Section 4 we display and discuss the main results of
the commuting subsidization policies. Eventually, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions.
4In Germany energy taxes encompass a gasoline tax and an eco-tax component. >From a resident￿ s
perspective both components are institutionally identical. Therefore, they are considered together as
energy tax. We further do not consider lump-sum tax funding (see Tscharaktschiew and Hirte, 2011).
32 Theoretical Background
In the following we discuss a worker￿ s decisions in a stylized urban setting. This shows
that tax deductions of commuting expenses may distort a worker￿ s non-spatial as well
as spatial decisions and how the results might be a⁄ected by the di⁄erentiated funding
schemes considered. This also provides a basis for discussing the e¢ ciency e⁄ects in the
full-￿ edged spatial model of the urban economy employed in the simulation.
2.1 A Simple Spatial Model to Illustrate Basic E⁄ects
The city we have in mind is monocentric concerning shopping activities, i.e.there is a
Central Shopping District (CSD), but not with respect to housing and employment. The
place of residence (employment) is de￿ned by its distance from the CSD, denoted by
x(y). We assume, for the time being, that y ￿ x. Accordingly, commuting distance is
denoted by X = x ￿ y. Each identical worker chooses the number of shopping trips z,
which is equivalent to the level of consumption, housing consumption q and leisure ‘, the
residential location x as well as the working location y to maximize utility u = u(z;q;‘)
subject to a monetary budget and a time constraint. The budget constraint is
(p + cx)z + r(x)q = [(1 ￿ ￿
m)w(y)L ￿ CX + ￿
m￿X]D. (1)
It states that expenditures for shopping (incl.shopping trip cost) and housing equal (labor)
income net of taxes and commuting costs plus tax deductions of commuting expenses.
The monetary cost of each shopping trip is p + cx where p denotes the mill price of the
composite consumption good and c denotes monetary travel cost per round-trip shopping
kilometer. The price of housing per square meter and period is r(x). The daily net
return to labor (1 ￿ ￿m)w(y)L is the after tax wage where the hourly wage rate w(y)
might di⁄er according to the location of the workplace; ￿m is the marginal wage tax rate;
and L is the ￿x number of working hours per workday. C denotes monetary commuting
cost per round-trip kilometer; ￿ is the tax deduction rate of commuting expenses; and D
is the number of workdays (working shifts).
The time constraint is
(L + TX)D + txz + ‘ = E. (2)
The time endowment E is used for working, commuting, shopping trips and leisure. T
4and t denote travel time per round-trip kilometer required for commuting and shopping,
respectively. The consolidated full economic budget constraint then is
(p + cx + ￿tx)z + r(x)q + ￿‘ = ￿E, (3)
where
￿ =
(1 ￿ ￿m)w(y)L ￿ CX + ￿m￿X
L + TX
(4)
is the value of time (VOT) of the representative urban worker.
Di⁄erentiating utility subject to Eq.(3) with respect to z;q;‘;y and x yields the ￿rst-order













as well as the ￿rst-order conditions for the optimal spatial location decisions encompassing
the working location choice (provided D > 0)
(1 ￿ ￿
m)w
0 (y)L = ￿(C + ￿T ￿ ￿
m￿) (6)
and the condition for the optimal residential location (slope of the bid-rent curve)
r




(C + ￿T ￿ ￿m￿)D
q
. (7)
These conditions show that the income tax, ￿m, distorts all decisions. Deductions can
neutralize the e⁄ect of the income tax on the VOT if ￿X = w(y)L. While this eliminates
the distortions regarding the non-spatial decisions (Eq.(5)) it, however, does not eliminate
the distortions concerning the spatial location decisions (Eq.(6)) and (Eq.(7)). As a
consequence, there is no optimal subsidy or tax deduction rate eliminating all distortions
arising from income taxation.
2.2 The Model with German Institutions
Because further distortionary taxes exist in Germany tax interaction e⁄ects and tax rev-
enue recycling e⁄ects are important issues (see also Parry and Bento, 2001). Therefore
we have to discuss e⁄ects of tax deductions simultaneously with other taxes which might
5be used to ￿nance the commuting subsidy. In the following we extend the previous model
by adding German consumption taxes and energy taxes and take di⁄erent travel modes,
m, into account.
In Germany energy taxes are levied with amount ￿f per unit of gasoline consumed. Gaso-
line consumption per round-trip kilometer of shopping and commuting, respectively, are
denoted by f (m) and F (m) where individual demand depends on the travel mode m
used for the corresponding trip purpose.
The tax on general consumption and on the energy tax liability, ￿z, as well as on other
monetary travel expenditures (services), ￿p (m), are distinguished because travel expen-
ditures might be subject to a lower sales tax rate depending on travel mode m.5 The
German income taxation scheme is progressive and exactly implemented in the simula-
tion model. For the time being we assume that there is a general tax allowance, A; and,
in addition, workers are allowed to deduct ￿XD from the income tax base, thus the tax
liability is ￿m (w(y)LD ￿ A ￿ ￿XD) Then, the monetary budget constraint turns into
￿
(1 + ￿
z)p + [1 + ￿




z + r(x)q = (8)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿
m) w(y)L ￿ [1 + ￿
p (m)] C(m)X ￿ (1 + ￿
z)￿





The workers time constraint is again Eq.(2). After forming the consolidated full economic
budget constraint the corresponding ￿rst-order conditions for the worker￿ s choice problem













and the FOCs concerning the employment location and residential location decision
(1 ￿ ￿
m)w
0 (y)L = ￿[1 + ￿
p (m)] C(m) ￿ (1 + ￿
z)￿
fF (m) ￿ ￿(m)T(m) + ￿
m￿. (11)
5In Germany the sales tax rate on public transport fares (7% in 2011) di⁄ers from that imposed on
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is the VOT of a worker facing commuting distance X.
Eliminating the distortion in the leisure-housing decision (Eq.(10)) requires deductions to
neutralize all taxes in the VOT, hence, ￿m￿X = ￿mw(y)L+￿pCX+(1 + ￿z)￿fFX. This
allows neither to eliminate the distortions in the leisure-consumption decision (Eq.(9)),
nor to eliminate the distortions in the spatial location decisions (Eq.(12) and Eq.(13)).
The FOCs also show that the way deductions are ￿nanced is important because each tax
enters the FOCs in another way.
2.3 Tax Deductions, Tax Funding and the VOT
Next we focus on the VOT as a crucial variable concerning the workers￿ s individual deci-
sions. The VOT represents the (average) net return from labor as well as the opportunity
costs of time. Therefore it provides a link between labor supply and location decisions,
two of the features we integrate in our approach. Deriving the impact of a revenue neutral
change in the deduction rate on the VOT also requires to consider the e⁄ect of the tax
instrument used for funding deductions.
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d￿ | {z }
relocation e⁄ects
, (14)
where h 2 fm;z;p;fg denotes the tax used for funding the subsidy. The ￿rst term on the
right-hand side (RHS) represents the direct e⁄ect of a change in the tax deduction rate
￿. An increase in ￿ directly raises the VOT by ￿mX=[L + T (m)X] which is the higher
7the higher the marginal tax rate (the higher the income), and the longer the commuting
distance. The second term on the RHS is the funding e⁄ect accruing on account of changes
in tax rates required to ￿nance tax deductions. The third and fourth term on the RHS
comprise relocations of the places of employment and of residence as a response to the
change in deductions and the corresponding change in tax rates. We cannot derive the
exact e⁄ects without simultaneously di⁄erentiating the whole system of FOCs. We refrain
from doing this and focus on the funding e⁄ect in the following.
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C (m) + ￿fF (m)
￿
X d￿z
d￿ if d￿z, ￿p = ￿z
(1 + ￿z)F (m)X d￿f
d￿ if d￿f
(15)
According to Eq.(15) each tax discussed a⁄ects the VOT negatively.6 There is, however, a
remarkable di⁄erence between income and other taxes. While the funding e⁄ect is negative
and proportional to commuting distance X for sales tax (d￿z;d￿p) and energy tax funding
(d￿f), the impact of the commuting distance in the case of income tax funding (d￿m) is
positive. The reason for the latter is that tax deductions depend on the marginal income
tax rate. As a consequence income tax funding favors longer commuting trips while the
other funding schemes punish longer commuting trips. Accordingly, ceteris paribus urban
sprawl7 and congestion are expected to be more pronounced with income tax funding than
under other policies. However, with income tax funding there is a further e⁄ect, w(y)L,
independent from commuting distance. This e⁄ect lowers the VOT to a relatively large
extent compared with the commuting distance dependent e⁄ects under the alternative
6For the case of income tax funding this implies assuming w(y)L ￿ ￿X > 0:
7There is no standardized procedure how to measure urban sprawl. Nechyba and Walsh (2004) point out
that a common way to document the presence of urban sprawl is to look ￿rst at the evolving relationship
of population levels between suburbs and central cities. Anas and Rhee (2006) use changes in the daily
average travel time per worker as a measure of sprawl. Ewing et al.(2002) operationalize, or measure,
sprawl using several variables that represent di⁄erent aspects of development patterns (e.g.neighborhood
mix of homes, jobs, and services). Brueckner (2000) de￿nes sprawl as excessive spatial growth of cities
while Su and DeSalvo (2008) refer to the decentralization of urban population. We measure sprawl as
changes in average commuting distance, the spatial expansion of the urban area and the decentralization
of employment and residences.
8funding schemes. But since a lower VOT discourages labor supply and, in addition,
favors slower travel modes such as walking, the e⁄ects on urban sprawl, congestion and
emissions are in fact ambiguous.
Furthermore, the e⁄ects of sales and energy tax funding depend on the travel mode
chosen. The higher gasoline usage the stronger the adverse e⁄ects on the VOT imposed
by energy tax and sales tax funding. This provides an incentive for commuters to diminish
these adverse e⁄ects by switching to alternative, i.e. less gasoline intensive, travel modes
such as walking or public transport. As this lowers emissions and congestion it improves
welfare. The magnitude of the funding e⁄ect also depends on the degree of change in the
respective tax rate. This, in turn, depends on the tax base and the respective behavior
of the household, e.g.travel mode choice. Because there is a tax allowance on income,
the income tax rate presumably increases more than other tax rates to ￿nance the same
change in the deduction rate. This induces stronger e¢ ciency losses in comparison to
funding by other than the income tax.
Let us summarize:
￿ Tax deductions raise the value of time entailing higher labor supply primarily of
high-skilled workers. Unfortunately, this is attended with more sprawl, more con-
gestion and higher emissions.
￿ Tax funding impairs this positive e⁄ect on labour supply through lowering the VOT.
This, in turn, mitigates the adverse e⁄ects of tax deductions on urban sprawl, con-
gestion and emissions.
￿ Income tax funding rewards long-distance commuting while the other funding schemes
sanction longer commuting trips. However, the commuting distance independent
part of the funding e⁄ect under income tax funding lowers the VOT relatively. As
a consequence, the net e⁄ect on, e.g.,congestion is in fact ambiguous.
￿ Energy tax funding discriminates against commuting by automobile, sales taxes do
it to some degree, too. Hence, both imply less road tra¢ c and, thus, less congestion
and emissions.
Having discussed distortions and various e⁄ects induced by tax deductions the next step
would be to discuss optimal instruments. Because there is no full set of instruments a
9second-best issue arises and the optimal subsidy has to be derived in an optimal tax
approach. The appropriate approach would be to maximize indirect utility subject to the
￿rst-order conditions of the location decisions (reservation wage, Eq.(11), and the slope of
the bid-rent, Eq.((12)), the public budget constraint, resource constraints and conditions
concerning local land and local labor markets. Because this cannot be solved analytically
without setting additional restriction we direct our attention to the simulation model.
Nevertheless, the discussion above suggests that it is useful to di⁄erentiate subsidies and
taxes for di⁄erent travel modes or di⁄erent travel purposes.
3 The Spatial Simulation Model
The spatial urban general equilibrium model we use is an extension of the model described
in Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2010a). Here we add an endogenous city fringe to the model
required to look at tax deduction induced impacts on urban sprawl. In the following we
only provide a description of the model￿ s main characteristics.
The model explicitly takes into account the interactions between di⁄erent markets (land,
labor, commodities), households and ￿rms in nine urban districts. The innermost zone
of the city provides the best accessibility and, thus, will endogenously become the city
center. All zones have a diameter of 4.5 kilometers so that the whole urban area expands
over 40.5 km. Supply of land increases with distance from the city center but is ￿xed
for all but the outer suburbs where land supply is endogenous. The urban locations are
linked via a transport network with given distances between the centers of the locations.
A su¢ ciently large number of identical and competitive ￿rms produce in each zone a zone
speci￿c commodity by applying a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines land and labor
supplied by low-skilled and high-skilled workers. These commodities are sold at place
of production. The ￿rms located in the same zone are identical but goods di⁄er across
locations implying spatial product di⁄erentiation.
Urban households are heterogeneous concerning idiosyncratic tastes for urban locations.
In addition, household type heterogeneity is taken into account by di⁄erentiating house-
holds with respect to employment status (non-working households and working households
each encompassing one potentially employed person) and skill level8 (low-skilled and high-
8The di⁄erentiation with respect to skill level applies to working households.
10skilled households). Idiosyncratic tastes and household type heterogeneity imply mixed
land use and di⁄erentiated travel patterns within the urban area (see also Anas et al.,
1998; Train, 2003; Tscharaktschiew and Hirte, 2010b).
Households endogenously decide where to reside, where to work (working households),
where and how much to shop, how much labor to supply and, thus, how often to com-
mute (working households), how much land to rent, and which travel mode to use. The
residential location i and the employment location j (working households) determine
the speci￿c location choice sets fig and fi;jg; respectively. Households face a simul-
taneous decision problem in terms of consumption quantities (composite commodity Z,
housing approximated by lot size q and leisure ‘) and location decisions (residential and
employment locations). The random utility function of a typical (working) household is
Uij = u[Z (zijk;8k);qij;‘ij]+￿ij, where u[￿] is a Cobb-Douglas utility function and Z rep-
resents the CES shopping subutility function over shopping locations k: The idiosyncratic
taste constant "ij represents the stochastic part of the random utility function which is
relevant for the location decisions.
The household maximizes utility with respect to consumption (location speci￿c shopping),
housing, leisure, and the number of workdays (only working households) subject to the
budget and time constraints, (similar to Eq.(8) and Eq.(2)). It also faces a discrete
mode choice problem concerning travel modes walking, public transport and automobile
available for the trip purposes commuting and shopping. A discrete choice approach is
also applied to determine residential and working locations of the households based on U.
All spatial location decisions implicitly determine commuting and shopping trip distances,
frequencies and ￿along with travel mode speci￿c travel speeds ￿travel times. Individual
automobile travel causes three kinds of externalities: congestion (travel time delays),
additional gasoline consumption, and additional CO2 emissions, all caused by the fact
that the marginal car driver may a⁄ect travel speed of all other drivers being on the road.
Since all travel decisions are endogenous, the extent of the externalities is endogenous as
well. Automobile travel times, gasoline consumption and CO2 emissions are endogenously
determined and speci￿ed by empirically determined functional relationships.
The federal government levies progressive income taxes, sales taxes and energy (gasoline)
taxes, grants tax deductions to working households and income transfers to non-working
households and redistributes ￿according to ￿scal interdependencies among public author-
ities in Germany ￿shares of its revenues to the local urban government. The federal tax
11revenues not redistributed to the urban private households and the city government are
used for public consumption consisting of purchasing locally produced commodities. The
city government receives its shares of federal tax revenues and levies a local lump-sum
tax to ￿nance local goods such as roads. Infrastructure costs consist of opportunity costs
due to land used for infrastructure. Absentee landowners use their rent income and an
external transport sector monetary travel costs (except for travel-related taxes) accruing
from urban travel activities to purchase urban commodities.
In Germany there is a progressive federal income taxation scheme. The average tax rate
increases with an increase in taxable income (see Figure 1). Commuting subsidies are
granted as deductions from the income tax. Basically the treatment of tax deductibility
of commuting expenses is implemented as it is applied in Germany. This means it is
taken into account that the individual taxpayer could also deduct a general employee tax
allowance (see also the parameter A in the theoretical model) from the income tax base
(currently 920 e/year) as long as this allowance exceeds aggregate commuting and further
non-commuting expenditures.9
Figure 1: Income taxation scheme Germany (Tari⁄ 2009)
On account of the spatially di⁄erentiated land, labor and commodity markets prices in
the urban area are spatially di⁄erentiated too. They endogenously adjust to clear all
local markets. The model is implemented in GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling Sys-
tem) and calibrated to an average German metropolitan area of 1.75 million households.
Adding endogenous land supply at the urban fringe is an important feature concerning
the ￿ndings. Nonetheless it does not change the benchmark in comparison to a model
with ￿xed land endowment. This is the reason why we do not present the calibration
and the characteristics of the benchmark city in the following. The reader is referred to
Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2010a).
9Consequently, this treatment allows to account for the fact commuters whose residential and employment
locations are close to each other could actually not directly bene￿t from higher deductions up to a certain
level because aggregate deductible commuting and (non-commuting) expenses do not exceed the general
employee tax allowance. The reason is that in such a case the taxpayer would behave rational by
deduction of the general employee tax allowance.
124 Simulation and Results
4.1 Research Design
Our research design is as follows: we vary the deduction rate in the range of 0:0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1:3
e/km. The benchmark level is 0.30 e/km. This implies that we consider an upper ceiling
of the tax deductibility rate which, on the one hand, exceeds monetary commuting costs
but, on the other hand, falls below full economic commuting costs (see Table 1). This
range allows to ￿nd optimal subsidy rates under income tax funding.
Table 1: Average (full economic) commuting cost (￿ Benchmark￿ )
Urban worker







Full economic commuting cost
[e/round-trip km]
1.61 2.20
We implement four scenarios di⁄ering in the way tax deductions are ￿nanced:
￿ Policy 1 (income tax funding): varying the (marginal) income tax rates,
￿ Policy 2 (general sales tax funding): adjusting the sales tax rate holding con-
stant the reduced sales tax rate on public transport,
￿ Policy 3 (energy tax funding): adjusting the energy tax rate,
￿ Policy 4 (multiple sales tax funding): adjusting, ￿rst, the reduced sales tax rate
on public transport (holding the general sales tax rate ￿x) and, then, adjusting the
general sales tax. If deductions are raised the reduced sales tax rate is incrementally
increased until it reaches the level of the general sales tax rate, then both tax rates
are raised together. If deductions decline the reduced sales tax rate is incrementally
lowered until zero, then the general sales tax rate is additionally lowered.
Policies 2, 3 and 4 also constitute a change in the tax base away from income to con-
sumption and energy taxation. We distinguish two scenarios concerning the adjustment
13of the sales tax rate. Raising the general sales tax rate but holding the reduced tax rate
constant, i.e.Policy 2, implies a raise in the subsidy to public transport. In contrast, rais-
ing the reduced sales tax rate on public transport until it reaches the level of the general
sales tax rate i.e.Policy 4, implies a reduction in the subsidy to public transport.
4.2 Spatial and Economic E⁄ects
4.2.1 Spatial E⁄ects
Starting with spatial e⁄ects, Table 2 displays the results for three selected levels of the
tax deduction rate. The results are printed as changes compared to the benchmark level.
The general pattern is in accordance with intuition. Abolishing tax deductions lowers
average commuting distances and causes an incremental shrinkage of the city as well
as a decline concerning suburbanization of residences and jobs. Raising the commuting
subsidy induces diametrical e⁄ects which are, however, surprisingly small. A doubling of
the deduction rate from currently 0.30 e/km to 0.60 e/km leads to a very small increase
in the average commuting distance of only 0.6% to 1.5%. An increase to 1.20 e/km, after
all an increase of 400% compared with the initial level, increases the average commuting
distance of at most 5.4%. Also very small is the percentage change in the city size. The
urban area increases by 0.14% to 0.52% as a response to a doubling of the deduction rate.
This is very small in comparison with the results of Su and De Salvo (2008) who found
much higher e⁄ects for car subsidies in the U.S. (an elasticity of about 0.1). One reason for
this weak impact in our study is that funding subsidies provokes an countervailing raise of
the tax rate used for funding. Another reason is that shopping trip costs do hardly change
by commuting subsidies. Furthermore, we consider di⁄erent types of individuals where
non-working households do not receive commuting subsidies and low-skilled workers face
only a small subsidy on account of their low marginal wage tax rate. Given that, abolishing
commuting subsidies is not an instrument to lower sprawl substantially. The gross e⁄ects
on residential and job relocation are also relatively small. Even raising the tax deduction
rate to 1.20 e/km prompts at most 7000 workers or a percentage of unity to relocate from
the city to the suburbs. These ￿ndings query the standard objection against commuting
subsidies, namely, that they are an important cause for suburbanization. Accordingly,
abolishing the tax deduction rate of commuting expenses is not a very e⁄ective device to
reduce sprawl or commuting distances.
14Table 2: Spatial e⁄ects of di⁄erent tax deduction rates under di⁄erent funding schemes
Tax deduction rate [e/km]
0.0 0.6 1.2
Income Tax Funding
Average commuting distance1 [%] ￿ 1.8 +1.5 +5.4
Suburban expansion [km2]/[%] ￿ 2.2/￿ 0.24 +1.3/+0.14 +2.8/+0.32
Spatial allocation of residences and jobs
Residences in the city2 [total]/[%] +1,595/+0.2 ￿ 1,486/￿ 0.2 ￿ 4,131/￿ 0.6
Jobs in the city2 [total]/[%] +633/+0.1 ￿ 392/￿ 0.1 ￿ 1,408/￿ 0.2
General Sales Tax Funding
Average commuting distance1 [%] ￿ 1.8 +1.5 +4.7
Suburban expansion [km2]/[%] ￿ 3.3/￿ 0.37 +4.2/+0.47 +12.4/+1.39
Spatial allocation of residences and jobs
Residences in the city2 [total]/[%] +1,916/+0.3 ￿ 2,223/￿ 0.3 ￿ 6,412/￿ 0.9
Jobs in the city2 [total]/[%] +633/+0.1 ￿ 366/￿ 0.1 ￿ 1,223/￿ 0.2
Energy Tax Funding
Average commuting distance1 [%] ￿ 1.8 +1.5 +5.4
Suburban expansion [km2]/[%] ￿ 3.4/￿ 0.39 +4.6/+0.52 +13.8/+1.55
Spatial allocation of residences and jobs
Residences in the city2 [total]/[%] +1,971/+0.3 ￿ 2,378/￿ 0.3 ￿ 6,997/￿ 1.0
Jobs in the city2 [total]/[%] +698/+0.1 ￿ 554/￿ 0.1 ￿ 1,996/￿ 0.3
Multiple Sales Tax Funding
Average commuting distance1 [%] ￿ 0.9 +0.6 +3.9
Suburban expansion [km2]/[%] ￿ 1.8/￿ 0.20 +1.5/+0.17 +9.6/+1.08
Spatial allocation of residences and jobs
Residences in the city2 [total]/[%] +1,155/+0.2 ￿ 949/￿ 0.1 ￿ 5,067/￿ 0.7
Jobs in the city2 [total]/[%] +369/+0.1 +95/0.0 ￿ 720/￿ 0.1
Changes in relation to the ￿ Benchmark￿
1 Averaged over all travel patterns and workers
2 Gains (losses) of the city = losses (gains) of the suburbs
4.2.2 Aggregate Labor Supply and Congestion
Figure 2 displays changes in the number of aggregate commuting trips which, due to
the complementarity of commuting trips and working days, is proportional to changes in
labor supply. Abolishing tax deductions reduces commuting trips and labor supply by
about 0.5%, while a raise of the deduction rate increases both. Doubling the deduction
rate from 0.30 e/km to 0.60 e/km raises labor supply by about 0.5% in case of energy
tax and general sales tax funding. Policy 2 and Policy 3, as well as Policy 4 (though to a
smaller degree) shift the marginal tax burden from labor to consumption. Consumption
and shopping trips are, therefore, getting relatively more expensive in comparison to
15commuting trips and labor supply. For this reason commuting and labor supply increase.
This e⁄ect, however, almost vanishes if the income tax is used to ￿nance subsidies. In
this case (curve with rhombuses in Figure 2), aggregate labor supply and commuting do
hardly change if the subsidy rate moves upward.
Figure 2: E⁄ects of tax deductibility of commuting expenses on commuting
trips
Despite this relatively small e⁄ects on aggregate labor supply, there are strong changes in
congestion and, more important, even di⁄erent signs of the e⁄ects. Figure 3 displays the
changes in congestion costs for di⁄erent subsidy levels and di⁄erent taxes used for funding.
All changes are printed as percentage changes compared with the benchmark (￿ = 0:30
e/km). With income tax funding (curve with rhombuses, Policy 1) and general sales
tax funding (curve with triangles, Policy 2) a reduction of the deduction rate mitigates
while an increase aggravates congestion. The changes range from a reduction of 2% to an
increase of about 5% and 8% and if the deduction rate achieves its upper ceiling, thus the
increase is slightly stronger with consumption taxes. Congestion accumulates faster than
aggregate commuting trips. Raising incomes when commuting subsidies are increased also
raise the number of shopping trips. Moreover, an increase in tax deductions causes the
VOT to increase which in turn favors mode choice toward faster travel modes such as
automobile contributing the most to congestion.
Figure 3: E⁄ects of tax deductibility of commuting expenses on congestion
Recall that Policy 4 (curve with circles) implies abolishing the reduced sales tax rate
advantage for public transport if the commuting subsidy is raised and expanding the
subsidy to public transport if the tax deduction rate is lowered. The ￿rst change boosts
automobile usage and, thus, aggravates congestion. The second change shifts demand
toward public transport and mitigates congestion. These e⁄ects explain the strong change
in congestion around the benchmark level of tax deduction rate.
The most interesting result is Policy 3 (curve with squares). Because the energy tax
constitutes a tax mainly on automobile usage, reducing the tax o⁄sets the positive e⁄ect
of a lower deduction rate on congestion. Therefore congestion exacerbates. In contrast,
congestion strongly declines if the energy tax rate is raised. The reason is that more and
16more workers switch their travel mode toward public transport. Because this does not
a⁄ect the level of commuting subsidies, this policy implies a strong decline in congestion.
Doubling the deduction rate reduces congestion by about 10%. This e⁄ect is non-linear.
Concerning congestion a high deduction rate plus a high energy tax imposes the strongest
positive e⁄ect. This policy discriminates in favor of public transport usage.
4.3 Aggregate Welfare and Environmental E⁄ects
Figure 4 displays the aggregate welfare e⁄ects measured by the equivalent variation (left
axis) as well as changes in travel related CO2 emissions (right axis). Urban welfare is
printed as the solid dotted lines and welfare of absentee landowners by the dashed lines
with dots. The solid lines with triangles depict changes in CO2 emissions.
Figure 4: Aggregate welfare e⁄ects of tax deductibility of commuting
expenses
4.3.1 Income Tax Funding (Policy 1)
Income tax funding of commuting subsidies is the case usually discussed in the literature
(see above). Concerning this policy the upper left panel of Figure 4 reveals that the
optimal deduction rate is 0.90 e/km which is three times as large as the current rate.10
However, the welfare gains achievable are at best about 70 million e or about 40 e
per household and year on average. Abolishing tax deductions lowers welfare by about
60 million e. There are opposite e⁄ects present. On the one hand, the net reduction of
income taxes for commuters which happens if deductions are increased lowers the taxation
of productive time use (see Kleven, 2004). This raises welfare. On the other hand, the
increase in tax deductions implicitly lowers the taxation on the externality and, thus,
lowers welfare (see Sandmo, 1975). A comparison with the absentee landowners shows
that gains and losses are also capitalized in rents, as the similar run of the curves indicates.
The e⁄ects on travel related CO2 emissions are small. Even a shift of the deduction rate
to 1.30 e/km raises CO2 emissions only by about 3% in comparison to the benchmark,
whereas abolishing tax deductions lowers CO2 emissions only by about 2%.
10If the urban fringe were exogenous the optimal deduction rate is considerably smaller, amounting to
0.50 e/km (see Tscharaktschiew and Hirte, 2011).
174.3.2 General Sales Tax Funding (Policy 2)
Funding tax deductions by general sales taxes induces the same sign but stronger e⁄ects
than income tax funding (see the upper right panel of Figure 4). Abolishing tax deductions
lowers welfare twice as strong as with income tax funding. An increase in tax deductions
implies a much stronger and almost linear increase in welfare. At a deduction rate of
1.00 e/km welfare improves by about 430 million e. Because this policy induces a
relative reduction of distortionary labor taxation it constitutes a shift toward stronger
taxation of time used non-productively. This also slightly dampens the negative e⁄ect
of the deductions on congestion by raising the full economic travel cost of shopping.
Interestingly, tax deduction induced e⁄ects on the labor market increases incomes in the
city which causes aggregate consumption and, thus, shopping (trip) activities actually to
increase. Because of the similar pattern in regard to changes in congestion the e⁄ects on
CO2 emissions are almost the same as in the case of income tax funding.
4.3.3 Energy Tax Funding (Policy 3)
The results regarding energy tax funding are displayed in the lower left panel of Figure 4.
Abolishing tax deductibility diminishes welfare, which is almost the same compared with
sales tax funding. The gains from raising deductions are higher compared to those ac-
cruing under consumption tax funding. Taxing gasoline taxes non productive use of time
(e.g. travel) and, in addition, imposes a stronger taxation on the congestion externality.
The most outstanding result is that this policy is the only one considered which achieves
a strong reduction concerning CO2 emissions, while the other policies entail a raise in
emissions. The reduction mainly stems from, ￿rst, a reduction in congestion and associ-
ated with this lower automobile emissions emissions per vehicle kilometer and, second, a
switch in travel mode choice away from emission intensive automobile road tra¢ c.
4.3.4 Multiple Sales Tax Funding (Policy 4)
The trends are the same than with consumption taxes. However, the strong impact on
congestion caused by the changes in the sales tax on public transport implies that welfare
e⁄ects around the benchmark level di⁄er from the welfare e⁄ects with general sales tax
funding. In particular, a local welfare maximum is reached at a deduction rate of 0.22
18e/km and a global minimum at the deduction rate of 0.41 e/km. Also with respect to
this funding procedure e⁄ects are capitalized in rents but the e⁄ect is less distinctive.
4.4 Aggregate Distribution E⁄ects
Figure 5 displays distribution e⁄ects based on aggregated equivalent variations of the
di⁄erent household groups.11 In each scenario the non-working households (dashed curves)
bene￿t from a decrease and su⁄er from an increase in the deduction rate. First, they also
contribute to ￿nancing the subsidy and second, they also su⁄er from congestion, even
though to a smaller extent than working city residents.
Figure 5: Aggregate distribution e⁄ects of tax deductibility of commuting
expenses
The dotted lines in Figure 5 represent the equivalent variation of low-skilled households. In
general low-skilled workers bene￿t from commuting subsidies which are ￿according to the
current institutional arrangement of the tax deduction policy in Germany￿also granted
for public transport usage. Their gains are the lower the stronger their contribution to
￿nancing the subsidy and the higher their labor supply is taxed which is the case with
income tax funding (Policy 1). Because their tax burden is the lowest under energy tax
funding they prefer Policy 3. However, with multiple sales tax funding (Policy 4) their
bene￿ts and losses around the benchmark deviate from general trends. Here, a reduction
of the subsidy to public transport required to ￿nance higher tax deductions adversely
a⁄ects the low-skilled workers.
Welfare changes of the high-skilled workers are printed as solid curves in Figure 5. They
are very di⁄erently a⁄ected depending on the funding scheme. Income tax funding (Policy
1) makes them worse o⁄because this directly taxes their labor supply and counteracts the
positive e⁄ect of the deductibility (see also Eq.(15)). Their tax burden is the lowest with
sales tax funding (Policy 2). With energy tax funding (Policy 3), however, two opposite
e⁄ects are at work. While they bene￿t from a reduction in congestion they su⁄er from the
11Aggregate distribution e⁄ects take the relative shares of the calibrated number of the di⁄erent household
types into account. Because the number of urban households di⁄ers among the di⁄erent household
types (Non-working households: 586,250; low-skilled working households: 931,000; high-skilled working
households: 232,750) aggregate distribution e⁄ects may di⁄er from those accuing on an individual
household level basis (see below).
19stronger taxation of automobile travel. Because of the fact that the congestion externality
decreases with an increase gasoline taxation the ￿rst e⁄ect is relatively strong close to the
benchmark level, the latter e⁄ects is predominant for higher deduction rates implying a
decline in welfare.
To summarize: from the perspective of the non-working households the best policy is a
deduction rate of about 0.18 e/km together with a stronger subsidy on public transport
(multiple sales tax funding). The low-skilled workers as a whole are better o⁄with energy
tax funding and higher deductions and the group of high-skilled workers as a whole gains
the most under general sales tax funding and higher deductions.
4.5 Acceptance of Policies
An individual worker is probably more concerned with changes in his relative wealth as
well as in his individual payo⁄s in comparison to other income groups. This will be im-
portant concerning his acceptance of policies. Therefore we also consider the equivalent
variations of di⁄erent groups in per capita terms to gain an insight into the level of accep-
tance of di⁄erent policies (see Figure 6). Of course, the inhabitants of the metropolitan
area cannot decide on federal policy. Nonetheless, metropolitan areas might lobby in fa-
vor of one of those policies. Three large cities are even able to vote on such a policy in
the Federal Council of Germany (Bundesrat) because they coincide with a German state
(Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen). Furthermore, cities￿inhabitants vote on representatives for
the German parliament (Bundestag).
While aggregate distribution e⁄ects imply that higher deductions cause a redistribution
in favor of the low-skilled workers, looking at distribution e⁄ects in per capita terms
(see Figure 6) reveals that the high-skilled workers bene￿t considerably more than the
low-skilled with higher deductions by general sales tax or multiple sales tax funding.
Figure 6: Average distribution e⁄ects (per household) of tax deductibility of
commuting expenses
There is no policy most favored by more than one group of urban households in terms
of individual welfare. The non-working households (dashed curves) prefer reducing de-
ductions along with multiple sales tax funding, low-skilled workers (dotted curves) prefer
higher deductions ￿nanced by energy taxes (as absentee landowners do, see Figure 4),
20whereas high-skilled workers (solid curves) most favor higher tax deductions ￿nanced by
general sales taxes. Though, lower skilled workers constitute a small majority (931,000)
in comparison to the other households (819,000), they might not be able to push their
representatives to vote for this policy. To achieve this it is useful that more than one
group agrees on a speci￿c policy. Given that, higher deductions ￿nanced by energy taxes
or general sales taxes are the two policies unambiguously advantaging both groups of
workers in comparison to the benchmark ￿though the distribution e⁄ects are totally dif-
ferent. Unfortunately, because high-skilled workers lose with income tax funding and even
with a low level of multiple sales taxation and low-skilled workers might lose with multi-
ple sales tax funding both groups have to worry if they push a raise in deductions when
the funding scheme applied by policymakers is uncertain. If their representatives have
to compromise to achieve higher deductions this might be even worse for them than the
benchmark. Moreover, if only a small increase in tax deductibility is politically feasible,
the low-skilled workers might even be better o⁄ if deductions are reduced under multiple
sales tax funding, though the possible gains per household are less than 100 e/year.
These could be the reasons why the current policy arrangement seems to be acceptable
by the working households. Even the non-workers might accept the current situation
because reducing deductions provide them a welfare gain of at most 50 e/year which is
only fraction of their yearly income.
5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the tax deductibility of commuting expenses by applying
a spatial urban general equilibrium simulation model to an average German metropoli-
tan area. Although there is large body of literature analyzing commuting subsidies or
transport subsidies in general, only a restricted number of papers theoretically analyzes
commuting subsidies in the form of tax deductions. This paper contributes to the lit-
erature by providing for the ￿rst time an insight into the magnitude of the e⁄ects of
tax deduction policies by implementing several institutional details of the German tax
system in regard to tax deduction (in particular non-linear progressive income taxation).
In addition, the approach takes into account the following features that have never been
simultaneously treated in a spatial setting when studying tax deduction of commuting ex-
penses: endogenous labor supply decisions and location decisions where the urban area is
21not restricted to be monocentric, household heterogeneity by considering multiple house-
hold types di⁄erentiated by skills and employment status, commuting and non-commuting
(shopping) trips, di⁄erent funding schemes, travel mode choice, travel related externali-
ties such as congestion, and feedback e⁄ects between urban land, labor and commodity
markets.
Concerning income tax funding (usually considered in the related literature) our results
suggest that the optimal tax deduction rate in terms of welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolitan area is about three times as large (0.90 e/km) as the current deduction rate
in Germany. The endogeneity of the urban fringe is the main reason why this optimal
deduction rate is even higher than we found in another paper (0.50 e/km, see Tscharak-
tschiew and Hirte, 2011). This rate would then be close to monetary commuting costs
needed for a commuting round-trip but would still be far below full economic commuting
costs needed for such a trip (see Table 1). However, if negative e⁄ects of urban sprawl
or higher CO2 emissions are taken into account the optimal deduction rate is likely to
be considerably lower. Moreover, the maximum aggregate welfare gain is very low and
amounts to about 50 million e/year (on average about 30 e/year per household). The
results also indicate that the tax deduction rate hardly contributes to urban sprawl ac-
cording to the de￿nition of sprawl used here. There is the expected positive relationship
(raising the tax deduction rate raises average commuting distance and the spatial expan-
sion of the urban area) but the magnitude of the e⁄ect is very small ￿e.g. the elasticity
is about 0.01 (0.003) with respect to commuting distance (the size of the urban area).12
Hence, concerning suburbanization the deductibility of commuting expenses is suggested
to be only from a minor importance, at least in the case of German cities. Positive e⁄ects
of tax deductions on labor supply and negative e⁄ects on congestion are also very small
due to countervailing e⁄ects on the VOT accruing under income tax funding.
However, one might ask why shall income taxes be used for funding? Usually the reasoning
is that income tax deductions shall be ￿nanced by income taxes in order to avoid mixing a
tax reform (change in the tax base) with a commuting subsidy policy via tax deductions.
However, in a spatial world with externalities and other time consuming activities funding
subsidies by other taxes could be justi￿ed from an optimal tax point of view (see Kleven,
2004; and Sandmo, 1975).
12Evaluated at a tax deduction level of 0.6 e/km.
22Therefore, we have also looked at alternative funding procedures. Then the positive labor
supply e⁄ects of the subsidy can be combined with a less harmful tax on general con-
sumption or energy. This is equivalent to a change in the tax base in favor of taxing non-
productive time use, e.g.shopping trips, or in favor of taxing externalities, e.g.congestion,
caused particularly by road tra¢ c. These are the reasons why using the energy tax for
funding (Policy 3) provides the highest urban welfare gain. Moreover, this policy is the
only one considered reducing travel related CO2 emissions. Under this policy the high-
skilled workers and low-skilled workers gain. In addition, non-working households are
hardly a⁄ected by this policy. The switch to consumption or energy taxation implies that
the optimal deduction rate is beyond our ceiling of 1.30 e/km. In these cases, granting
higher deductions indirectly constitutes a tax switch away from labor taxation, usually
argued to provide a distinctive potential to raise economic e¢ ciency.
But what does this result mean? First, if one wants to examine tax deductions of com-
muting expenses it is necessary to distinguish di⁄erent household types, di⁄erent travel
modes, di⁄erent travel purposes as well as endogenous labor supply and location deci-
sions. This allows to di⁄erentiate the properties of di⁄erent taxes and subsidies which
overlap concerning labor supply but are distinct concerning travel mode choice or travel
purposes. Second, given the ￿ndings of the analyses here further research shall focus on
these interrelations of tax deductions and di⁄erent taxes available for funding. Does our
￿ndings really imply that tax deductibility of commuting expenses should be raised to
such a high level? Concerning our research design the answer is yes. If, however, the whole
tax system is debatable it might be much more promising to directly switch the tax base
from income toward energy or consumption along with eliminating commuting subsidies.
Then, longer commuting distances would not be rewarded and, thus, urban sprawl as well
as emissions should be even lower than under the policy arrangement considered here.
This, however, is a task for future research.
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